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Of Once and Future Kings: Rethinking the Anglo-American 
Analogy in the Rising Powers Debate  
Th. W. Bottelier 
Department of History 
King’s College London 
This is a draft for publication. Please do not cite without permission. Comments 
welcome. 
Abstract  
This paper seeks to advance the so-called rising powers debate of the past fifteen years by 
interrogating its selective use of the past. Key to the debate are the impact of rising powers like 
China on the international order, and how to accommodate them. Historiography plays a crucial 
but unappreciated role in the debate, as scholars look to the past to make sense of the future. 
Especially in the United States, many compare the US now to Great Britain before 1940, the 
idea being that both faced the same difficulties of decline relative to rising challengers. This is 
the core case of power transition theory in the field of International Relations. It is also, 
fundamentally, weak. As I show, it relies on a ‘long chronology’ of British decline that the past 
quarter-century of historical scholarship on twentieth-century Britain has undermined. I instead 
propose a ‘short chronology’ of the transition away from Britain that emphasizes agency and 
contingency over structure and the longue durée. Bringing the work of historians to the rising 
powers debate thus indicates that the key factors to study are not grand systemic forces, but 
short-term politics and diplomacy. 
Keywords  
Rising powers; United States; Great Britain; declinism; history and international relations 
theory.   
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The phenomenon of rising powers has been one of the central themes in the past fifteen years 
of international relations, be it the actual practice or its academic study (IR). Consider the 
spectacular success of the concept of the ‘BRICs.’ Coined in 2001 by a Goldman Sachs 
executive, Brazil, Russia, India and China themselves adopted it as their collective self-
identification after 2006. Academics arrived last to the feast, for instance founding a 
Cambridge-based Centre for Rising Powers in 2011 dedicated to studying the BRICs.1 This is 
not to say they had been sitting still in the meantime: especially in the United States and China, 
the first decade of the new millennium saw the rise of a great debate on the rise of China in 
particular, its effect on US dominance, and whether it meant the US itself was in fact in decline.2 
 One of the central questions posed by the academics, the investors, and indeed the 
emergent powers themselves is whether newly rising great powers are a threat to world order. 
That is why Jim O’Neill, the banker behind BRICs, thought including them in the G7 was 
necessary; why Beijing insists its policy is ‘peaceful rise’; and why possible US-Chinese 
conflict looms so large in the debate in those countries.3 
 It is not the first time that rising powers have caused such debate. The debate about 
China is in many ways the spitting image of that about Japan in the 1970s and eighties, including 
the worries about world order upheaval and great power conflict. And just like with Japan, 
scholars look to history for answers to their questions. They even prefer the same historical 
analogy for Washington’s dilemmas today: Britain’s in the first half of the twentieth century. 
So we find that relative to the United States, China is in the same position that Washington 
itself was in vis-à-vis Britain until 1945, and that the strategic dilemma the US faces today is 
very akin to the one Germany created for Britain leading up the First World War.4 
 In other words, the idea is once more that we find ourselves on the threshold of a power 
transition: the decline of a dominant state met with the rise of a challenger.5 Will China be a 
new US, Washington a new London, and the transition a peaceful succession? Or will Beijing 
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be a new Berlin, destabilizing world order and risking great power war? The IR theory of power 
transitions would certainly answer pessimistically. Power transition theorists see in these shifts 
moments of grave and imminent danger to international order that lead to instability or even 
general war. Such dislocation in turn produces a general reordering of the international system, 
with a new hierarchy of power and new institutions.6 
 I seek here to contribute to the rising power debate not by charting the future, but by 
interrogating its view of the past. I focus on the Anglo-American transition of power, if only 
because Germany never overtook Britain as a global power. The United States did. It is worth 
underlining this easily forgotten point. This is because, as I show below, the dominant view of 
the transition among both IR scholars and historians is profoundly declinist, imagining a 
decrepit Britain in permanent descent from the Victorian period onward. Yet as a growing 
revisionist literature shows, Britain remained much stronger for much longer in the twentieth 
century than we are used to thinking. Taking this new historiography on board profoundly 
changes the picture of the Anglo-American transition, with significant conclusions for the 
current rising powers debate. 
 In addition, from a theoretical point of view the Anglo-American transition is 
profoundly puzzling. It was accompanied by remarkable peace and continuity, not upheaval or 
massive conflict. Not only did the United States succeed Britain as the supreme liberal-capitalist 
power; it projected its power along an arc across Eurasia that had long been the “great 
geopolitical faultline” of British strategy too. Donald Cameron Watt called it “the replacement 
of Britain by the United States as the major universal power on the periphery” of Eurasia.7 As 
a result, the Anglo-American case has been crucial to theories of peaceful power transitions. 
Yet these theorists rely on declinist historiography as well, assuming the transition happened 
much earlier than revisionist historians would imply. As I argue in the essay’s third section, this 
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forces them into a ‘most-likely’ case study setup, when they could be testing their argument on 
a much harder case later in the century.8 
 Contemporary IR scholars and practitioners did not see a United States rising above the 
British Empire until the 1940s. When he coined the term ‘super-power’ in 1944, the IR theorist 
William T. R. Fox thought there were three, not two: the United States, the British Empire and 
the Soviet Union.9 A year earlier Harold Macmillan, then the chief civilian of the Allied 
Mediterranean campaign, was telling his (British) personnel that Britons were the “Greeks in 
this American empire,” who had to run operations “as the Greek slaves ran the operations of 
the Emperor Claudius.” It is probably best to see Macmillan’s quip as no more than a public 
schoolboys’ pep talk . His was an intriguing implication, however. The transition is commonly 
thought of as a long-term, structural, macroeconomic process. What the ‘Greeks’ quote implies 
is that how these Anglo powers navigated their transition on the short term—that is, their agency 
and interaction—was key instead.10 
  The Anglo-American transition of power is central to a great many arguments. Beyond 
the power transition debate, it has served Cold War historians who argue that an expansionist 
United States in the 1940s “march[ed] out and inherit[ed] Britain’s role.”11 It is a crucial case 
in theories of world-economic ‘hegemony’ and the debate over whether it brings international 
stability.12 The same goes for the so-called American empire debate of the past decade, where 
the post-1945 United States is often compared to the Victorian British Empire. The assumption 
underlying this comparison is not merely that the United States looks like its mid-nineteenth 
century predecessor, but is in fact subject to the same historical process of rise, apex, and fall. 
What is implicit in the Victorian comparison was stated clearly by the US IR theorist Robert 
Gilpin when he wrote of an interwar “interregnum” in the interwar period between British and 
US hegemony.13 
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 All of these approaches make the crucial contribution of putting contemporary US 
power in its greater historical and international context. Yet in so doing they make use of a long 
chronology of the Anglo-American transition that recent historical scholarship has undermined. 
The next section takes a closer look at this chronology, which depicts the US’s eclipse of Britain 
as a long-term, macro-historical process. I submit that it lends itself well to teleology. The 
transition’s outcome—US superpower—appears inevitable in many accounts. Gilpin’s 
‘interregnum,’ derived from the language of royal succession, is exemplary of this, compressing 
the crucial period leading up to the transition into little more than an interlude. The Victorian 
comparison in the American empire debate likewise discounts the intervening interwar period, 
and is akin to Whig history, as I discuss below. This is not to say that taking a longue durée 
view necessarily involves a teleological claim—many macro-histories include contingency in 
their accounts of grand historical processes.14 However, it is to insist that the declinism of the 
long chronology involves Whig history, if in reverse. Though this does not make all macro-
history Whiggish, it does not necessarily lead to the right questions or identify the key causes 
of how the US came to eclipse the British Empire. 
 This paper follows a very different approach. It offers a re-periodisation of the transition 
to arrive at a short chronology in which the US’s eclipse of Britain was an abrupt shift, not a 
prolonged interregnum. Suggestively, the historian John Darwin has compared this shift to the 
end of the Cold war and the collapse of the Soviet Union, equally rapid and unexpected.15 The 
analysis I propose centres on precisely those factors most stressed by a contemporary like 
Macmillan: agency and contingency. Re-periodisation thus goes hand in hand with re-
conceptualisation. 
 To arrive at this argument I make several moves, detailed in the second section. First 
and foremost, the essay connects the rising powers debate to a strong attack by historians of 
twentieth-century Britain on declinism. These revisionists remind us that Britain never declined 
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in absolute terms, and show that even in relative terms it only declined vis-à-vis a very small 
group of competitors. Though declinists all (briefly) acknowledge this, they go on to depict a 
weak and dependent Britain that, anti-declinists insist, hardly reflects historical reality. 
Speaking of ‘decline,’ in other words, loads the dice in favour of declinism. The right term is 
that Britain was overtaken by the United States. Consequently, the transition happened at the 
moment of the United States’ rise and no earlier. Anti-declinists take further issue with the 
state-centeredness of the decline story. It is blind to how Britain was not merely a home-grown 
great power but a global power, drawing on a network of ‘British connections’ including the 
Empire-Commonwealth, the City of London’s financial empire, and a global economic 
hinterland that included the United States. This revisionist argument is in fact supported by key 
texts within the traditional approach to the transition, as a closer look at the historiographical 
differences within the latter reveals.16 
 All of this is more than just a historians’ quibble. If the Anglo-American transition 
happened on the short term, was driven more by agency than structure, and came unexpectedly 
and contingently, then as an analogy it presents the rising powers debate with some uneasy 
conclusions. One is negative: as the idiosyncrasy of the last transition implies, there are no easy 
lessons to be drawn from history. The other is positive: it strongly suggests that the key variables 
are not long-term economic changes but day-to-day diplomacy and politics. A third conclusion 
is more theoretical. “Few IR scholars spend sufficient time asking what it is we mean when we 
talk about history,” George Lawson has written. This paper shows that taking periodisation, 
chronology and modes of historical comparison seriously can substantially advance key IR-
theoretical debates.17 
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The Long Chronology 
Fundamental to this essay is the assumption that there is no clean distinction to be made between 
the work of IR theorists and that of historians. Though not historians, theorists make use of 
particular interpretations of the past—historiographies—that substantially affect their case 
selection, causal arguments and thus theories. In this case, the central issue is one of 
periodisation, or what the social theorist Eviatar Zerubavel calls “punctuation of the past.”18 
When did the transition happen? That question is simultaneously one about how and why it 
happened. Periodisation is thus an eminently theoretical pursuit. Though this makes 
engagement with history a potential interdisciplinary nexus, it is rarely done on neutral ground. 
More often than not, the encounters of non-historians with history take the form of a cattle raid, 
quickly in and quickly out, with little regard for the locals. Historical facts are lifted from (often 
secondary) sources, without due consideration for the minutiae of interpretation and 
historiographical debate. 
 This is an old historians’ complaint. What historians often forget is that through such 
cattle raids, certain historiographies are nevertheless imported into other fields, much like the 
bull the ancient Irish hero Cú Chulainn must defend in the epic, the Cattle Raid of Cooley. 
Historians and IR scholars both should acknowledge this point. It is not a call for the 
colonization of IR by historians. Instead it is a call for a mutually beneficial dialogue, in which 
historiography is taken seriously as a tool for theorizing and conceptualization, and IR (or other 
social-scientific) theory can prompt new historiographical questions. Interdisciplinarity, in 
other words, benefits more from trading rather than raiding cattle. 
 In the rising powers and power transition debates, competing theories rely extensively 
on declinist historiography, which periodises the Anglo-American case according to a long-
term timescale and its associated dates and key events (the stuff of chronology). I call this the 
‘long chronology.’ The long chronology places the transition in the early twentieth century. 
Rethinking the Anglo-American Analogy 
 
8 
 
With some simplification, there are two variations on the theme, corresponding to two different 
proposed moments of transition. Britain’s decline and the United States’ rise are dated either to 
around 1900, or to 1918 and the aftermath of World War I. The supposed interregnum that 
followed is a derivative of the last dating.  
 Each of these periodisations privileges a distinct causal force, each focusing primarily 
on British decline. The 1900 dating emphasizes long-term productive-economic processes. 
Distilled to its essentials, between 1890 and 1900 Britain lost the manufacturing primacy it had 
gained in the Industrial Revolution to the US and Germany, and so entered a long, painful 
twentieth-century decline. The 1918 dating foregrounds long-term financial and international 
political-economic changes caused by the First World War. The war destroyed the gold standard 
and the first globalization; Britain, the greatest benefactor and profiter of both, lost the most, 
and never recovered its pre-war primacy. Building on the 1918 dating, in the interregnum 
version Britain appears as an ‘ersatz’ hegemon in the face of post-1918 shifts in the 
international system. The unifying theme of the long chronology’s different versions is Britain’s 
passivity in the face of longue durée processes. Moreover, each periodisation starts from the 
transition’s eventual outcome—Britain’s eclipse by the United States—rather than from the 
process leading to it. 
 The earliest proposed periodisation of British decline flows from “a search for [its] ‘root 
causes’,” as Keith Neilson put it.19 The fundamental argument underlying the 1900 dating is 
clear and macroeconomic. In the two decades surrounding the fin de siècle, the long-time 
nineteenth-century primacy Britain had enjoyed in gross national product came to an end, as 
the country’s economy was surpassed in productivity by first the United States and then 
Germany. It never recovered its productive primacy, and so, goes the claim, started the long 
slide from its onetime Victorian height to the much humbler status of just another middling 
power later in the twentieth century. This manufactures-based argument is often linked to the 
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view that Britain missed the boat, as it were, of the Second Industrial Revolution, coming to lag 
behind its German and US rivals technologically.20 Thus one can find proponents interpreting 
British colonial expansion as the reactive and defensive policy of a declining power, rather than 
a dominant one; its settling of outstanding differences with the United States in the Western 
Hemisphere as appeasement, not rapprochement; and its joining the anti-German Entente as 
retrenchment instead of forward policy.21 To cite two evocative headings, around 1900 the 
British Empire became a “weary titan” whose fate was to await the “coming of a bipolar 
world.”22 The latter showcases how far the longue durée can stretch. It directly links the loss of 
Britain’s productive primacy around 1900 to the rise of the protagonists of the Cold War half a 
century later. In other words, it reduces the first half of the twentieth century to a coda of 
structural economic changes that occurred at the century’s outset. 
 The First World War periodisation of British decline is based on a less straightforward 
and parsimonious argument. Rather than compare the national economic bases of great powers, 
the second variation on the long chronology looks at changes in the international political 
economy. The watershed events of this story are the abandonment of the gold standard and the 
emergence of the so-called ‘warfare state’ over the course of the Great War. As the first total 
war, it forced those fighting it to mobilize all their assets—not just military, but also 
organizational, financial, monetary and industrial.23 Warfare states were set up to do this, 
putting the final nail in the coffin of the nineteenth-century night watchman’s state. They 
promptly ‘monetarized’ the economy, in Joseph Schumpeter’s phrase, seizing control of the 
money supply which had previously been determined by the strictures of the gold standard. 
Controlled from the City of London, the gold standard had given Britain what Marxian 
international political economists term hegemony over the world economy.24  
 Yet by the time Britain emerged victorious from the war, it had been reduced to a net 
debtor nation. Most of its foreign debt was held by New York banks, marking the emergence 
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of that city as a major international financial centre for the first time. The United States became 
a net creditor for the first time as well. Without its financial primacy or gold standard, Britain 
could no longer act as the guarantor of the world economy. It had lost its hegemony. The United 
States meanwhile was poised to seize that position. That it took twenty years to do so does not 
fundamentally affect the argument that the end of the pre-war globalized economy, with its free 
trade and stable gold standard, signalled the end of British hegemony.25 Like the 1900 version, 
the 1918 dating privileges grand processes, though in this case the rise of the warfare state, the 
end of the gold standard regime, and the City’s loss of financial primacy. The United States’ 
rise to hegemony is then ultimately a response to the instability of a world dislocated by these 
vacuums. More extreme versions of this argument in fact claim Britain’s replacement by the 
United States was the natural outcome of global capitalism reaching a new equilibrium out of 
a period of self-produced chaos.26 
 A variation of the same dating is the interregnum story. Proceeding from the second 
periodisation, proponents confront the fact that the United States did not fill its shoes until the 
1940s by arguing that the function of hegemon fell back to Britain almost by default. Because 
the United States failed in its moment of international leadership under Woodrow Wilson and 
refused to join the League of Nations, Britain remained as a sort of ersatz hegemon. Because 
of this less than optimal outcome, later on “the British couldn’t and the United States wouldn’t” 
save the interwar international (economic) order from the Great Depression, as Charles 
Kindleberger pithily concluded.27 Unsurprisingly, the interregnum story finds much purchase 
among US diplomatic historians. Nonetheless influential treatments of British international 
history during the Interbellum also accept it, with Britain appearing as an overextended great 
power forced into retrenchment.28 The interregnum story treats the Interbellum as a single 
homogenous period, beginning and ending with a world war. It is these wars, products of an 
international system unbalanced by the lack of a real centre, that drive London’s eventual 
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eclipse by Washington. The transition’s outcome looms large. The ups and downs of British-
US relations and fortunes during this period seem less significant by contrast.29 
 A final and more recent variation on the long chronology is the American empire debate. 
Treating the United States as an empire, once limited to Europeans and Marxists, has in the past 
decade become prominent in the United States itself. The influential US IR theorist Joseph Nye 
called it “the dominant narrative of the twenty-first century.”30 One of the great attractions of 
this move is that it puts the United States’ international dominance of the past seventy-odd years 
into its greater historical context. By emphasizing historical comparison with older empires, it 
allows scholars to view US primacy through a wider-angle lens than older prisms, like 
American exceptionalism or the Cold war era.31 This advantage notwithstanding, the empire 
debate has been persistently dogged by doubts about the value added of using the concept of 
empire to understand the United States’ role in world politics. Much of the criticism, from 
within IR, history and beyond, has focused on the concept’s fuzziness and degree of 
applicability to US foreign policy.32  
 Comparisons and analogies between the modern US and historical empires, chiefly 
Rome and Victorian Britain, drive the empire debate.33 Yet although the United States gained 
its independence from the British Empire, and the two remained historical contemporaries, 
indeed rivals for much of their existence, this hardly features in the literature. Little to no work 
explores what role, if any, the Anglo-American transition played in their imperial similarity. 
One certainly finds many suggestive parallels and evocative metaphors between Washington’s 
behaviour and that of London: one author asks whether the United States has picked up “the 
torch that the British dropped a half century back,” while another posits that British imperialism 
was a “dry run for the modern American variety.” The underlying question here is, as the 
historian Bernard Porter asks, “if two historical phenomena, however far apart, appear so 
similar, might there not be some common factors behind them both?”34  
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 Porter’s question is classically historical. Yet rather than taking the seemingly obvious 
next step, and looking at the period in which the US actually overtook the British Empire, many 
of the answers put forth involve static comparisons between the assumed heydays of British 
and US imperialism in the Victorian and (post-)Cold War eras, respectively. They thus forego 
what would appear to be the crucial case: the direct intersection, in time and space, of British 
imperialism and global US expansionism in the First and particularly Second World Wars. A 
recent and systematic treatment of the parallels drawn by the empire debate serves to underline 
this point.35 
 Seeking to show how the United States carries on Britain’s imperial legacy even in a 
very different world, Julian Go compares the two Anglo nations’ respective phases of 
expansion, apogee and diminishment, concluding they both showcased the same “patterns of 
empire.” His is a long chronology, putting Victorian Britain side by side with the Cold War 
United States, like the old economist’s rule of thumb comparing peak to peak and trough to 
trough. This limits him, however, to indicating how the United States’ imperial experience in 
the Philippines and Guam was analogous to Britain’s in India and Fiji, or how Britain’s 
relatively small empire before 1815 was like in size to the United States’ around 1900. To Go, 
Britain and the United States underwent the same historical cycles of rise, apex, and fall, making 
the parallels between one and the other the products of these grand historical arcs. He derives 
this concept from Immanuel Wallerstein’s world-systems approach of the 1970s and eighties, 
specifically Wallerstein’s idea that states rise to and fall from hegemony over the world-
system’s centre.36 Go does not, however, incorporate criticism then levelled at Wallerstein that 
he employed teleology and had written a Whig history in which all things tended to his 
conclusion—“history as scripture” where human action does not matter very much.37 
 This tendency to flatten out agency and contingency defines the long chronology. 
Fundamentally, whether the transition is explained according to national wealth, function in the 
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world economy, the international system, or patterns of empire, and whether it is periodised 
according to early, middle, or late dates, the unifying theme is how little Britain could do about 
the US’s eventual ascendance. 
 A more apt characterization would be that the two countries navigated the power shift 
between them so successfully that its outcome appeared inevitable only in retrospect. Power 
transition theory, with its focus on the dangers inherent to such transitions, gives an idea of 
what an achievement this actually was. Historians of Anglo-American relations have long 
underscored this impression in their accounts of the variable, often unfriendly and sometimes 
downright hostile relations between the two countries in the first half of the twentieth century. 
The late 1920s indeed saw a naval arms race and a war scare, while throughout the 1930s 
relations were cold rather than cordial.38  
 Furthermore, the long chronology relies on a very particular understanding of British 
decline, as regular, linear, and long-term. A quarter-century of revisionist work on the 
twentieth-century history of the British state, industry, technology and Empire has exploded 
this neat account. It is no longer possible to confidently argue that the British Empire from circa 
1890 was weak, its technology inferior, its industry uncompetitive, or its state backward. In fact 
the Britain that emerges from these new histories is the world’s only global power, 
technologically advanced, well-organized and militarily prepared. Declinism appears as an 
ideology of the post-war era, and abandoning it implies that Britain was surpassed, suddenly 
and without warning. As Fox’s original definition of superpower indicated, “until the middle 
of the Second World War, it was not entirely clear to many contemporaries that Britain was a 
terminally declining [power].”39 
 It is necessary to “redefine the problem,” David Edgerton wrote in 1997, “of ‘decline.’ 
For the British relative decline has been from a position of extraordinary relative strength (…) 
The key to understanding it is explaining success and not failure, and in explaining decreasing 
Rethinking the Anglo-American Analogy 
 
14 
 
relative success, rather than increasing relative failure.” What is therefore needed is not an 
approach that starts from the transition’s eventual outcome and searches for its roots far back 
in time, as declinists do. The new historiography of twentieth-century Britain indicates that 
instead, the Anglo-American transition was propelled by contingent events, driven by 
international interaction (and so by agency) on the short term. Such a process is best understood 
through a short chronology.40  
 
The Short Chronology 
The revisionists of Britain’s decline do not directly address the issue of the Anglo-American 
transition, or the rising powers debate. Their primary concern is with the historiography of 
modern Britain, rather than that of Anglo-American relations, let alone US historiography. 
Their challenge to the declinist historiography of Britain nonetheless implies that Washington 
eclipsed London over a far shorter period than we are used to thinking of—a few years rather 
than many decades. This is what I term the ‘short chronology,’ which I detail further in this 
section. I also critically re-examine a key text in the long chronology tradition, aiming to show 
how in actuality crucial arguments underpinning it support a short chronology. 
  The main thrust of the British revisionist attack is aimed at what they have termed 
‘declinism.’ To paraphrase Edgerton, declinism is a sort of reverse Whig history, which instead 
of painting a picture of inevitable progress paints one of inescapable decline: “practically 
everything that ever happened in England was the seed [of its diminishment].” These authors 
hold that this image is highly simplistic and is made to justify the present rather than explain 
the past, as Herbert Butterfield argued in his seminal attack on Whig history. In two different 
strains of argument, a moderate and a radical reinterpretation of twentieth-century British 
history, the revisionists have sought to overturn the declinist consensus.41 
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 Moderate revisionists take issue primarily with the declinist periodisation of British 
decline. Their central argument is that declinists, like Paul Kennedy or Correlli Barnett, get the 
fall’s timing wrong. Thus while they dispute the interpretation of the sources, or declinist causal 
accounts, moderates do not challenge the idea that Britain declined itself. Instead, their debate 
with declinists revolves around power and its exercise in international politics, a classic theme 
in both diplomatic history and IR. One of the key moderate revisionist arguments is that 
declinists overestimate British power during its supposed height under Victoria, and 
underestimate it during the country’s allegedly terminal descent afterward. Fundamentally, they 
argue that it is impossible to directly derive a country’s international stature from its 
manufacturing base or technological advances. As the Canadian historian Gordon Martel puts 
it, “counting [Britain’s] coal mines and enumerating her rolling stock is a meaningless exercise: 
it [is] extremely difficult to translate units of wealth into instruments of power.”42  
 Because they reject the long-term, structural view of the long chronology, moderate 
revisionists reinterpret Britain’s fortunes in the first quarter of the twentieth century. Contrary 
to characterizing the First World War as a Pyrrhic victory, the moderates bring Britain’s status 
as one of that war’s main victors back to the forefront. They point out that after 1918 Germany 
and Russia, its main imperial rivals, lay prostrate; its empire had expanded; and that Britain, 
not the US, was (together with France) the guarantor of the post-war status quo through the 
League of Nations. Essentially, this means seeing Britain’s fortunes on their own terms, not in 
light of the eventual end of its time at the summit of global power. Corollary to this argument 
is an emphasis on agency: whether that of Britain or its allies and contenders internationally, 
the moderates “find the main dynamic variable in diplomacy,” in John Ferris’s words.43 
 The radical revisionist argument goes further because it seeks to overturn not merely the 
periodisation of British decline, but the terms of the debate itself. The moderates do not question 
the basic narrative of decline and fall, nor the choice of the nation-state as the frame for that 
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narrative.44 Radical revisionists do. Edgerton for instance challenges the utility of the concept 
of British decline as a prism on twentieth-century British history, on the grounds that it 
completely obscures the British state’s technological and military achievements. He goes so far 
as to argue that what one is dealing with here is not history but “anti-histories” of the British 
state—the uncritical adoption by historians of pundits’ accounts of the state of England from 
the 1960s.45 These have fused with the declinists’ desire to explain Britain’s eclipse as a global 
power to obscure how until at least the 1950s Britain was in fact an extraordinarily 
technologically advanced, militarily prepared, and particularly modern state that could easily 
stand the comparison with rivals like Germany, Japan, or the United States. 
 Radical revisionists go much further than the moderates in challenging the declinist 
account of Britain’s material power. They take great issue with the image of British military 
weakness traditionally associated with the 1930s. For example, radicals argue that the Royal 
Navy remained second to none until well into the Second World War. In like manner they have 
challenged the traditionally dim view of British air power, arguing the Royal Air Force 
technologically led the world and was outbuilding all other powers by 1939. They even 
challenge the entrenched consensus on Britain’s weakness on land, showing that despite its 
small size the British Army was the world’s most mechanized, quite to the contrary of the 
received opinion that this was the German Wehrmacht. Behind these reinterpretations lies a 
new account of British wealth and technological achievement, which radical revisionists argue 
were much greater in the first half of the twentieth century than declinists have assumed.46 
 Another strain of radical revisionism attacks the implicit nationalism in many declinist 
accounts. A central assumption behind declinism is that international power is home-grown; 
hence, the national unit of the United Kingdom is compared to the much larger US, Soviet 
Union and so on. However, as Edgerton argues, Britain’s power and advances on the world 
stage derived to a great degree from its ability to draw on its empire and the world economic 
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web, at the centre of which it sat.47 The fact that British international power during this period 
should not be seen as a monolithic thing that was ‘made in Britain’ is further underlined by the 
imperial historian John Darwin. Quite to the contrary of equating Britain with the UK in the 
first half of the twentieth century, as most of the IR and historical literature does, Darwin 
foregrounds what he calls the “British world-system.” This was a sort of subsystem of the 
international comprising Britain, its Dominions and subject colonies, British India, and the City 
of London’s global “commercial empire.” The component parts of this system interacted with 
and reinforced each other to constitute a British superpower avant la lettre. It was only when 
this world-system was fatally undermined during the Second World War that Britain’s days at 
the pinnacle of international relations were numbered.48 
 Darwin’s contention finds support in one of the key texts cited by proponents of the long 
chronology of the Anglo-American transition, Charles Kindleberger’s seminal study of The 
World in Depression (1973). As briefly noted above, Kindleberger’s main conclusion was that 
the Great Depression was so severe and prolonged because there was no single dominant 
financial centre and currency that, backed by a strong state’s monetary policy, could stabilise 
the world economy by preventing tit-for-tat protectionism and autarky drives. Britain and the 
pound sterling had been able to do this in the Victorian and Edwardian eras, but were unable to 
in the 1930s.49 An economic historian, Kindleberger chose his period (1929-1939) deliberately 
and carefully limited his financial and monetary argument to questions of economic history. 
His book, published during a later twentieth-century economic crisis, was highly influential. 
Within IR, Robert Gilpin and others extrapolated from Kindleberger’s argument to posit that a 
world without a single politically and economically dominant state is more prone to instability 
and war, an argument known as hegemonic stability theory.50 However, they did not take into 
account Kindleberger’s periodisation. Gilpin in fact treated the whole Interbellum as a single 
period, in keeping with the interregnum chronology. But the entire premise of Kindleberger’s 
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book is to divide the Interbellum in two, the break coming in 1929-31. Moreover, in the IR 
literature derived from Kindleberger’s work, political-economic dominance is cast in 
productive terms, much like in the work of historians of British decline like Kennedy. This 
contrasts with Kindleberger’s own financial and monetary focus.51  
 When related to the radical British revisionists’ reframing of Britain as the heart of a 
world-system and economic web, the problem with the IR literature’s extrapolation from 
Kindleberger becomes apparent. In The World in Depression, the turning point is the 1931 
financial crisis which began with a bank failure in Austria. When it mutated into the Depression, 
it frayed the web on which British power rested. Kindleberger, in other words, suggested that 
if there was a ‘root cause’ behind the transition away from Britain, it was the Depression, as it 
disturbed the equilibrium essential to British power. He thus stands much closer to the radical 
revisionists than he does to proponents of the earliest long chronology like Kennedy. To derive 
from his tightly spun financial and monetary argument a much larger theory about general 
international stability is furthermore a large leap to make. It is largely predicated on treating the 
interwar period as one whole – precisely what Kindleberger does not do. 
 Taken together, what emerges from all of these accounts is the need to periodise the 
Anglo-American transition of power according to a short chronology. Both the revisionist 
argument that Britain remained a world-leading power in the 1930s, and Kindleberger’s that 
the crisis of that decade was the cause of London’s eclipse, point to the late 1930s and 1940s 
as the key period. The key events were the Depression and the Second World War, which appear 
as abrupt shocks to Britain and the US’s positions, rather than codas of a longer process of 
decline. The short chronology stands the standard account on its head: Britain entered this short 
period as a remarkably strong power, yet by its end had been decisively overtaken by a US that 
had been comparatively weak. These rapid changes occurred not exogenously, like the 
macroeconomic shifts of the long chronology, but flowed from conscious political action, like 
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the choice and ability to rearm.52  This enables one to recover a sense of the options open and 
choices made by the people actually involved, and makes it difficult to take the transition’s 
outcome for granted. Where the long chronology paints an image of the Anglo-American 
transition as a Cartesian x-graph, with a declining curve intersecting a rising one, the short 
chronology is best likened to the volatile ups and downs of a seismograph.  
 This presents a host of new questions. The first is implied by how differently the 
revisionists and Kindleberger appraise British power: if Britain was in fact strong during the 
interwar period, or even the only global power, then how was it so rapidly eclipsed? Any answer 
to this central question must also confront the radical revisionists’ insistence that British power 
cannot be understood in national terms during this period, and that one must take the Empire-
Commonwealth into account. Indeed the radicals’ emphasis on London’s ability to mobilize the 
world economy against its enemies through its control of the world seas implies that British 
power was in a sense transnational. This raises difficult questions about international power, 
war, and interdependence, which should interest any IR scholar and are highly relevant to the 
current rising powers debate.53  
 A final, crucial, yet curiously understated issue raised by the short chronology is the 
trajectory of US power. When exactly the US rose to global dominance is a cardinal issue in 
any treatment of the Anglo-American transition, yet it is rarely if ever explicitly stated. The 
classic story is that the country rose to superpower through victory in the Second World War, 
but (as this essay has made abundantly clear) a large and influential section of academic opinion 
dates it to the First World War or even earlier. Few distinguish between either dating. Adam 
Tooze’s very well-received The Deluge (2014) is representative of this tendency. Tooze makes 
a strong case for the First World War periodisation discussed above, arguing the war marked 
the first time that the US began to dominate world politics, owing especially to the immense 
financial clout it amassed. Washington used this, according to Tooze, to force decisions in the 
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painful post-war transition to peace, for instance strong-arming France with the Dawes Plan 
following the French occupation of the Ruhr. However, because he ends his narrative in 1931, 
Tooze largely avoids the issue of the Depression, which affected the US more deeply and for 
longer than any other great power. Moreover, he assigns more guilt to the British Empire than 
to the US for worsening the crisis by embracing protectionism, implying Washington did not 
necessarily carry the most weight in the world economy. Indeed, he writes Britain was “the 
only truly global power” throughout the 1930s. Likewise, he ignores the US’s military 
weakness in the 1930s: the country was a minor power on land and in the air, while at sea its 
navy was outclassed by both Britain’s and Japan’s.54 
  The implication is that, in the 1930s, US power suffered a critical setback it would not 
overcome until the early 1940s. The British Empire, much more deeply embedded in the world 
order and economy, was less affected. Rather than going against the short chronology Tooze 
therefore actually supports it. He is not far at all from Kindleberger in seeing in 1931 a clear 
break in the Interbellum. However, like Kindleberger, he leaves open “the question, which 
‘declinology’ never adequately tackled, of how the United States succeeded to so many of 
Britain’s global claims and prerogatives.”55 This is also the question of how a comparatively 
weak United States could possibly have overtaken a strong Britain so rapidly. This, I contend, 
is best addressed through a short chronology. Not only does this stand the traditional image of 
the Anglo-American transition on its head; it implies the need for a change of focus in the 
current rising powers debate as well. 
 
Conclusion: The Historiography of the Anti-Historiographers 
There is much to gain from the dialogue between historical and theoretical approaches pursued 
in this essay. This is not a new argument. Recent years have seen a historical turn in IR, which 
insists that “history and social science are co-implicated” as scholarly endeavours. In that 
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tradition, this essay pushes back against the idea that periodisation, and historiography in 
general, is something only “historians do or are supposed to be doing,” to use the words of 
Anders Stephanson (a historian). Much work in the historical turn so far has been meta-
theoretical, aiming to break down the “eternal divide” between history and IR in the abstract. It 
has marketed the analytical and theoretical tools scholars can gain by marrying historical and 
social-scientific epistemologies, ontologies, and modes of analysis. This paper has taken a more 
concrete tack, showing how a quintessentially historical concern like periodisation is implicated 
in the explanations and theories even of non-historians.56  
My point has not been to lambast the debate’s consensus view as ahistorical and thus 
wrong-headed. On the contrary, I have attempted to show that even those who view 
historiography as the arcane business of historians nevertheless engage in it. I call this the 
‘historiography of the anti-historiographers.’ It may not satisfy the historian, but outside her 
parish it can easily go unchallenged, all the while affecting the way subjects are approached, 
categorized, and explained far beyond the historical vicarage, and indeed academia as a whole. 
It should therefore be taken seriously, and engaged with as if it was as openly and clearly stated 
as  social science theory. This can reinvigorate old debates and address new conundrums in 
international history that may yield important new insights. 
 Taking the historiography of the anti-historiographers seriously is not a call to 
colonization by historians of IR or other social sciences. The aim should instead be a mutually 
enriching dialogue between the two fields. That dialogue can take the form of criticism and 
controversy, as this paper has done from a mainly historical point of view. Nonetheless, it 
should not be lopsided. IR theory can reinvigorate and recast historical debates, as well. This 
essay, for instance, represents such an effort in transatlantic and diplomatic history, which 
David Reynolds claims “has played itself out as a dynamic historiographical force.” In a time 
of world and global history, imperial history, and ‘big’ history, a field concerning itself mainly 
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with the relations between just two Anglophone countries may indeed appear parochial. Yet 
Reynolds’s opinion is premature. By making historiography speak to social-scientific theory, 
transatlantic history can recover its dynamism. As the anti-declinists have shown, there is much 
we do not know about the Anglo-American transition.57 
 The same holds true for the rising powers and the future of world order today. Reacting 
to the concern generated by the rise of China especially, one side of the rising powers debate 
insists that power shifts do not necessarily lead to conflict, let alone a crisis in world order. 
Some even reject power transition theory wholesale. As alluded to above, others have pursued 
a small but fruitful avenue of research into the phenomenon of peaceful power transitions.58   
 Stephen Rock and Charles Kupchan were among the first to emphasize the peace of the 
Anglo-American transition, and how this puzzled classical power transition theory. In 
accounting for how peace not war “broke out” between Britain and the United States, Kupchan 
identifies progressive rapprochement as the central causal mechanism, driven by diplomatic 
agency as the major explanatory factor. His argument is thus conceptually very similar to the 
one made here. Nonetheless he follows a standard periodisation, dating the transition to 1900, 
around the time US GNP became the world’s largest. The result is that he chooses a most-likely 
case. Tying anti-declinist historiography to his framework would yield a significant theoretical 
gain. First of all, one would expect the ‘breaking out’ of peace in the chaotic 1940s to be much 
more puzzling than in the comparatively peaceful fin de siècle. Secondly, if what is at stake in 
this case is not the decline of one power intersecting with the rise of another, but one’s ascent 
outpacing another’s, then power transition theory requires rethinking. Finally, tying the re-
periodisation offered here to Kupchan’s argument further implies that the key issues at stake in 
the rise of new powers are diplomacy and politics.59 
 The consequences for global stability of the potential waning of US hegemony has been 
a major strain in the work of another US IR scholar, John Ikenberry. His main argument is that 
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US hegemony has been exceptionally liberal in character, a feature he thinks it shares with its 
Victorian British predecessor. Both were in succession “liberal hegemons.” By thus 
characterising Washington as London’s heir, Ikenberry tacks close to the American empire 
debate and the long chronology. On the issue of the current rising powers, Ikenberry is adamant 
that the international institutions built under the aegis of US hegemony, thanks to that country’s 
liberalism, take the interests of the rest of the globe sufficiently into account to survive the end 
of US dominance. This he contrasts to the period preceding the United States’ rise, which he 
(following Gilpin in particular) sees as an interregnum. A fresh historiographical perspective 
on Ikenberry’s historical comparisons opens up new and intriguing issues. If the United States 
rapidly and unexpectedly succeeded to Britain’s position, it becomes all the more of an 
achievement that the two countries overcame their markedly distant relations in the Interbellum 
to preserve liberal hegemony at its greatest moment of crisis in the 1940s. This has important 
consequences for Ikenberry’s argument. If the world order was not US-built but international 
at root, and built at a moment of high wartime crisis, then Ikenberry’s argument that we need 
not worry about US decline today is strengthened.60 
 A short-chronological approach to the empire debate may also lead to advances. For 
instance, in earlier work Go has argued that the manner of the United States’ rise was 
conditioned by the shape of the contemporaneous “global field.” The United States could rely 
on “European imperial networks rather than constructing a formal empire of its own,” working 
through rather than against them to secure its interests. Go’s global field theory seems especially 
applicable to Darwin’s idea of the British world-system. It is clear that British power flowed 
from this system, yet from Cold War alliances like the Australia-New Zealand-US (ANZUS) 
Treaty we know parts of it reoriented themselves toward the US. One is tempted to draw the 
analogy with current times. To what extent does US power rely on a ‘world-system’ of its own? 
How do rising powers relate to it? And is it possible, even necessary, for a would-be challenger 
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to co-opt such a system? Theory and historiography can go hand in hand to achieve analytical 
grip on such empirical questions.61 
 The historical perspective taken here can significantly contribute to the debate on 
today’s rising powers. There is, of course, the old historians’ caveat that there are no 
straightforward lessons to be drawn from history. Yet even with that in mind, the Anglo-
American example has some important implications for the way we talk about any mooted shift 
today. Much of the debate is pitched in grand-historical terms, as the epochal end of an era, 
whether something as short as the American half-century or as huge as the past two centuries 
of Western dominance. Yet it is clear from the above that the major transition of the past century 
was a short-term affair that took place over a few short years in the 1940s. None foresaw that 
moment or the manner in which the United States overtook Britain. The way events played out 
was not driven by structure or great historical forces but by the contingent choices of politicians 
and bureaucrats, diplomats and generals, and – not to forget – anti-colonial nationalists.  
 Diplomacy and politics, whether public or bureaucratic, determined the course of the 
transition. Consequently these should be the foci of the current rising powers debate, not 
systems or structures. We should keep firmly in mind that the situation can change radically 
and unpredictably in a brief timespan. None in the rising powers debate of the 1980s could 
foresee the end of the Cold War, the stagnation of Japan, or the US leap into unipolarity. David 
Armitage and Jo Guldi have recently claimed that history can only achieve relevance in the 
public sphere by orienting itself on the longue durée. Yet as this essay has shown, the opposite 
is true here. It is the short term that should occupy our minds if we want to understand the rise 
of the new powers.62 
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